

ATTACHMENT A TO SUBPART B—STANDARD A—NATIONAL AGENCY CHECK WITH LOCAL AGENCY CHECKS AND CREDIT CHECK (NACLC)

ATTACHMENT B TO SUBPART B—STANDARD B—SINGLE SCOPE BACKGROUND INVESTIGATION (SSBI)

ATTACHMENT C TO SUBPART B—STANDARD C—SINGLE SCOPE BACKGROUND INVESTIGATION PERIODIC REINVESTIGATION (SSBI-PR)

ATTACHMENT D TO SUBPART B—DECISION TABLES

### Subpart C—Guidelines for Temporary Access

147.28 Introduction.

147.29 Temporary eligibility for access.

147.30 Temporary eligibility for access at the CONFIDENTIAL AND SECRET levels and temporary eligibility for “L” access authorization.

147.31 Temporary eligibility for access at the TOP SECRET levels and temporary eligibility for “Q” access authorization. For someone who is the subject of a favorable investigation not meeting the investigative standards for access at those levels.

147.32 Temporary eligibility for access at the TOP SECRET and SCI levels and temporary eligibility for “Q” access authorization: For someone who is not the subject of a current, favorable personnel or personnel-security investigation of any kind.

147.33 Additional requirements by agencies.

AUTHORITY: E.O. 12968 (60 FR 40245, 3 CFR 1995 Comp., p 391).

SOURCE: 63 FR 4573, Jan. 30, 1998, unless otherwise noted.

### Subpart A—Adjudication

#### § 147.1 Introduction.

The following adjudicative guidelines are established for all United States Government civilian and military personnel, consultants, contractors, employees of contractors, licensees, certificate holders or grantees and their employees and other individuals who require access to classified information. They apply to persons being considered for initial or continued eligibility for access to classified information, to include sensitive compartmented information and special access programs and are to be used by government departments and agencies in all final clearance determinations.

#### § 147.2 Adjudicative process.

(a) The adjudicative process is an examination of a sufficient period of a person’s life to make an affirmative determination that the person is eligible for a security clearance. Eligibility for access to classified information is predicated upon the individual meeting these personnel security guidelines. The adjudicative process is the careful weighing of a number of variables known as the whole person concept. Available, reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, should be considered in reaching a determination. In evaluating the relevance of an individual’s conduct, the adjudicator should consider the following actors:

(1) The nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct;

(2) The circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable participation;

(3) The frequency and recency of the conduct;

(4) The individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct;

(5) The voluntariness of participation;

(6) The presence or absence of rehabilitation and other pertinent behavioral changes;

(7) The motivation for the conduct;

(8) The potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress;

(9) The likelihood of continuation of recurrence.

(b) Each case must be judged on its own merits, and final determination remains the responsibility of the specific department or agency. Any doubt as to whether access to classified information is clearly consistent with national security will be resolved in favor of the national security.

(c) The ultimate determination of whether the granting or continuing of eligibility for a security clearance is clearly consistent with the interests of national security must be an overall common sense determination based upon careful consideration of the following, each of which is to be evaluated in the context of the whole person, as explained further below:

(1) Guideline A: Allegiance to the United States.

(2) Guideline B: Foreign influence.

**§ 147.3**

- (3) Guideline C: Foreign preference.
- (4) Guideline D: Sexual behavior.
- (5) Guideline E: Personal conduct.
- (6) Guideline F: Financial considerations.
- (7) Guideline G: Alcohol consumption.
- (8) Guideline H: Drug involvement.
- (9) Guideline I: Emotional, mental, and personality disorders.
- (10) Guideline J: Criminal conduct.
- (11) Guideline K: Security violations.
- (12) Guideline L: Outside activities.
- (13) Guideline M: Misuse of Information Technology Systems.

(d) Although adverse information concerning a single criterion may not be sufficient for an unfavorable determination, the individual may be disqualified if available information reflects a recent or recurring pattern of questionable judgment, irresponsibility, or emotionally unstable behavior. Notwithstanding, the whole person concept, pursuit of further investigations may be terminated by an appropriate adjudicative agency in the face of reliable, significant, disqualifying, adverse information.

(e) When information of security concern becomes known about an individual who is currently eligible for access to classified information, the adjudicator should consider whether the person:

- (1) Voluntarily reported the information;
- (2) Was truthful and complete in responding to questions;
- (3) Sought assistance and followed professional guidance, where appropriate;
- (4) Resolved or appears likely to favorably resolve the security concern;
- (5) Has demonstrated positive changes in behavior and employment;
- (6) Should have his or her access temporarily suspended pending final adjudication of the information.

(f) If after evaluating information of security concern, the adjudicator decides that the information is not serious enough to warrant a recommendation of disapproval or revocation of the security clearance, it may be appropriate to recommend approval with a warning that future incidents of a similar nature may result in revocation of access.

**32 CFR Ch. I (7–1–12 Edition)**

**§ 147.3 Guideline A—Allegiance to the United States.**

(a) *The concern.* An individual must be of unquestioned allegiance to the United States. The willingness to safeguard classified information is in doubt if there is any reason to suspect an individual's allegiance to the United States.

(b) *Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying include:* (1) Involvement in any act of sabotage, espionage, treason, terrorism, sedition, or other act whose aim is to overthrow the Government of the United States or alter the form of government by unconstitutional means;

(2) Association or sympathy with persons who are attempting to commit, or who are committing, any of the above acts;

(3) Association or sympathy with persons or organizations that advocate the overthrow of the United States Government, or any state or subdivision, by force or violence or by other unconstitutional means;

(4) Involvement in activities which unlawfully advocate or practice the commission of acts of force or violence to prevent others from exercising their rights under the Constitution or laws of the United States or of any state.

(c) *Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include:* (1) The individual was unaware of the unlawful aims of the individual or organization and severed ties upon learning of these;

(2) The individual's involvement was only with the lawful or humanitarian aspects of such an organization;

(3) Involvement in the above activities occurred for only a short period of time and was attributable to curiosity or academic interest;

(4) The person has had no recent involvement or association with such activities.

**§ 147.4 Guideline B—Foreign influence.**

(a) *The concern.* A security risk may exist when an individual's immediate family, including cohabitants and other persons to whom he or she may be bound by affection, influence, or obligation are not citizens of the United States or may be subject to duress.